Abstract. This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental to a revenue-maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.
INTRODUCTION
In many developing countries, governments face a serious dilemma when raising tax revenues. Fiscal resources are urgently needed to finance essential state services, invest in infrastructure and provide the necessary inputs for future growth. These fiscal resources are often supposed to come from a fairly small number of financially sound firms and wealthy individuals, rather than from the relatively poor masses. However, these firms frequently find ways to escape their fiscal burdens using elaborate strategies to avoid and evade taxes. 1 The government may counter such tax evasion and avoidance by hiring additional tax officials to monitor firms more closely. If these tax officials are corrupt (with low tax revenues, there is little capacity to provide sufficient financial incentives for honest behavior), the government's efforts may be frustrated because the tax official may become a partner in crime in exchange for a bribe. This simplistic initial view on taxation in the presence of corruption suggests that governments may be trapped in settings with low tax revenues and high levels of corruption. 2 Nonetheless, surprisingly, little scholarly research examines the combination of tax evasion, tax avoidance and corruption in tax administrations. Most studies so far have addressed corruption and tax evasion among households (see, e.g., Besley and McLaren, 1993; Cerqueti and Coppier, 2009; Chander and Wilde, 1992; Hindriks et al., 1999; Marjit et al., 2000) . This body of literature is closely related to the economics of crime, and it thus focuses primarily on containing crime with appropriate incentive schemes (wages, fines, etc) . Obviously, there is a comprehensive body of literature that addresses tax evasion in general (see Slemrod, 2007 for a survey). In the early literature on tax evasion by firms, the standard model of household tax evasion was simply transferred to firms; for a survey of this literature, see, for example, Cowell (2004) . The more recent literature uses new types of models to explore related matters, such as the linkage between competition and tax evasion Runkel, 2006, 2011) or the internal costs of control of tax evasion to a firm (Chen and Chu, 2005; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005) . Tax avoidance plays no role in these studies.
We are interested in the borderline cases between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Due to the complexities of modern day businesses, it is not sufficient to lay down the fundamental rules in the tax code. In addition to the tax law, many detailed implementation rules must clearly state the government's claim for taxation. Otherwise, clever tax accountants will manipulate the tax base, such as by claiming that a firm owner's private expenditures are business-related costs. The number of pages of primary federal tax legislation demonstrates the scale of implementation rules. In the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom, federal tax legislation covers 5,100, 7,200 and 8,300 pages, respectively; however, in Turkey, Russia and Mexico, tax legislation covers only 350, 700 and 1,600 pages, respectively. 3 The lack of detailed implementation rules may lead to a type of legal limbo between tax evasion and avoidance, which is characterized by the prevalence of 'tax loopholes'.
Tax authorities around the world have considerable difficulty drawing a clear line between tax evasion and avoidance. 'Commissioners frequently complain of the lack of good managerial information for timely decisions' (IMF, 2015, p. 40) . Recent discussions in the media on so-called 'cum/ex' trades in which dividend payments are used for tax arbitrage provide a good example of this issue. Both developed and developing countries currently struggle to close this tax loopholes. For example, India and Swaziland only recently introduced laws that aim at preventing tax avoidance related to cum/ex trades. 4 The complexity of tax arbitrage makes it difficult even for highly developed economies with comprehensive tax codes to close these tax loopholes. For instance, Bloomberg reported on investigations against former employees of Deutsche Bank. One accused banker claimed that '[t] hese transactions were legal when they took place as all tax experts said at the time', 5 but German tax authorities thought differently and alleged that 'firms fraudulently obtained hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of tax benefits'. 6 In the same article, the Wall Street Journal Europe explicitly referred to the tedious job of closing these tax loopholes: 'The market for cum/ex trades largely died off in 2011, when tax authorities closed loopholes and exchange officials fine-tuned how they handled certain transactions [. . .] '.
In less developed countries, tax disputes are often not well documented, but there is some anecdotal evidence that tax loopholes play a significant role, as the examples of India and Swaziland have shown. Some of these tax loopholes may even be purposely preserved. For example, in South Africa, a taxpayer can ask the tax authority for a binding ruling with respect to any transaction (Dalton, 2012) . As the tax authority is bound by its rulings, this procedure reduces the risk of wrongdoing on the taxpayer's side. Taxpayers, however, are not forced to follow tax authority's rulings. As these rulings are not binding for taxpayers, they do not eliminate tax loopholes but rather give clever tax arbitragers some guidance on how to exploit tax loopholes. Another sign of a lack of interest in closing tax loopholes may be the hesitation of many developing countries to participate in the OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. BEPS aims to reduce international tax competition and close tax loopholes that are frequently exploited by multinational corporations. Only 16 developing countries actively participate in BEPS negotiations.
7 Some countries may simply have no interest in pushing for international tax coordination, as they benefit from being low-tax jurisdictions. Overall, however, these are a small number of countries. Most low-and middle-income countries could benefit from an internationally coordinated and clearly defined tax base, as they typically do not qualify as tax havens (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009) . For example, 'Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status' (Action 7 of the BEPS) tries to improve the definition of establishments. This is particularly relevant in a digital economy in which firms can easily generate profits in a country while avoiding taxation in that country as long as BEPS rules are not adopted. Hence, low-and middle-income countries could improve their tax base by redefining establishment status according to the BEPS rules, but they remain hesitant to do so.
There are various explanations for the particularly fuzzy implementation rules of developing countries. First, some countries may simply lack fiscal capacity. Without profound expertise in both the finance ministry and the tax administration, it is impossible to produce detailed rules for complex accounting transactions. The government has to leave decisions about complex tax issues to the discretion of the tax officials. Second, the tax administration itself may have an interest in maintaining an incomplete tax code. This gives the administration discretion in setting firms' tax liabilities. Bureaucrats in the tax administration may lobby to prevent the elimination of tax loopholes. Third, the government itself may strategically create tax loopholes to fight tax evasion via corrupt tax 6. Jenny Strasburg, Eyk Henning and Madeleine Nissen, 'Deutsche Bank Office Raided in Tax Probe', Wall Street Journal Europe, 10 June 2015, pp. 15, 18. 7. Another 61 developing countries were involved in regional network meetings, which were mainly designed for information exchange, but they did not actively participate in the BEPS process; see http://www.oecd.org/tax/developing-countries-and-beps.htm.
Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes officials. Corrupt tax officials help firms hide income from the government by rubberstamping manipulated tax files. Firms can either bribe corrupt officials or try to exploit the loopholes. In the former case, they will have to pay a bribe, thus sharing the tax savings with the corrupt tax official. In the latter case, they might be punished in court, but they keep the full tax savings when they are successful. Which strategy is more profitable for a particular firm will depend on the expertise of the firm's accountants and the size of the tax loopholes. If the government leaves a sufficient number of tax issues undecided, it becomes more attractive for firms with able tax accountants to focus on tax loopholes rather than on colluding with corrupt tax officials. Thus, increasing the volume of tax loopholes can both reduce the total revenue loss from tax evasion and curb corruption. We do not claim that this third mechanism is empirically more important than the other channels. We just want to highlight that, in the presence of corruption, governments may have incentives to not close all loopholes. This mechanism might seem paradoxical at first, and -to the best of our knowledgeit has not been analyzed in the literature so far.
We establish a simple model that allows us to analyze the role of tax loopholes in an economy in which officials in a corrupt tax administration support tax evasion by firms. In the benchmark scenario without corruption (Section 2), firms face a tradeoff between the benefits from exploiting tax loopholes and the risk of being found guilty of tax evasion. We assume that firms differ in their likelihood of being sentenced. Firms that, for example, have more experienced accountants and top legal experts are less likely to be punished in court because they will be able to use tax loopholes and create borderline cases between illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance. In the second scenario (Section 3), the government employs corrupt tax officials who perfectly monitor each firm. The firms are informed about their individual abilities to exploit tax loopholes regarding a lawsuit, and the corrupt officials know only the distribution of abilities. The firm and the corrupt official may become partners in crime, in which case the corrupt official receives a bribe in exchange for rubberstamping the firm's tax files. Firms with more able accountants, however, may find it profitable to ignore the official's bribe demand and risk a verdict of tax evasion in court. Whether the corrupt official makes an offer that is attractive for less and more able firms will depend on the size of the tax loopholes. The larger the scope of the tax loopholes, the more attractive the loophole option is for more able firms. The government can exploit this mechanism precisely at this juncture. By maintaining a sufficient volume of tax loopholes, it can entice more able firms not to bribe tax officials. Tax loopholes limit the power of corrupt officials and, therefore, change the bribe demanded from the firms. In Section 4, we show that the result of our admittedly simple model also holds when only a fraction of tax officials are corrupt. Section 5 analyzes the case in which the protection offered by corrupt officials is incomplete. Firms that pay the bribe still have a positive probability of being sentenced for tax evasion, and we show that the corrupt official may have an incentive to target more able rather than less able firms in this case. However, the main result that the government may not want to close all tax loopholes still holds. In Section 6, we show that the strategic role of tax loopholes still prevails when we extend the government's strategy space and allow S. Marjit et al. for purely random tax audits, which are conducted independently of the tax official's assessment of individual tax files. Section 7 concludes.
A SIMPLE MODEL OF TAX LOOPHOLES
We first establish a model for tax loopholes before we introduce corruption. To keep things simple and to maintain consistent wording, we will use the example of tax loopholes for a tax on corporate profits. We assume that the precise tax liability of a firm is, to some extent, a matter of dispute. The tax code may define taxable profits, but calculating the tax base will always allow some room for maneuvering, which typifies borderline cases between tax avoidance and tax evasion. If a firm wants to be entirely safe, it will not engage in accounting transactions that might potentially be classified as tax evasion by the tax authorities. Alternatively, a firm can reduce its tax liability by an amount e, which might be judged as tax evasion in a lawsuit.
8 All the tax statements of a firm are inspected by a tax official. If the tax official finds disputable tax liabilities, he or she will forward the case to superiors who conduct a detailed tax audit and initiate a lawsuit when e > 0. If the court classifies the firm's tax planning as tax evasion, the firm must pay the tax. In addition to the payment of the back taxes, the entrepreneur also suffers the moral cost of being characterized as a tax evader; the monetary equivalent of this moral cost is denoted by c. Firms differ with respect to their ability to use tax loopholes. Firms with more experienced accountants and legal experts are less likely to be punished in court because they can create borderline cases between illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance. Furthermore, ambiguities in the tax code can be exploited more easily by certain firms. For example, the line between taxable and tax exempt entities is often fuzzy. For purposes of simplicity, we assume that there are two types of firms: i = H, L. The probability that the accounting transactions of type H firms will be judged as tax evasion is g < 1. The probability that the transactions will be classified as legal tax avoidance is (1Àg). The parameter g can also be understood as a proxy for the completeness of the tax code. A high g indicates an almost complete tax code that makes it difficult for firms to exploit tax loopholes without losing a lawsuit. We will refer to an increase in g as the closing of tax loopholes. Firms of type L will always lose such lawsuits and will suffer the moral cost of tax evasion.
10 Therefore, firms of type H face a lower expected cost for the same amount of potential tax evasion. A fraction b of all firms are of type L, and the share of H-type firms is 1 À b.
8. For simplicity, we will refer to e as tax evasion, although some firms may be acquitted. 9. Alternatively, we might assume a penalty for the attempted tax evasion, which would, however, raise the question whether the penalties should be included as government revenues. The assumption of a moral cost avoids such a revenue effect. The main results of the paper do not depend on the specific modeling approach. 10. The results would not change if L-type firms had also a positive chance of succeeding in a lawsuit but with a probability lower than g. An alternative way of modeling heterogeneity is to assume that H-type firms will be able to lower the evasion charges in a lawsuit by more than the L-type firms.
Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes
The expected payoff from exploiting tax loopholes amounts to the following:
for types H and L, respectively. Hence, L-type firms would never risk using the tax loopholes, and H-type firms will exploit tax loopholes if the risk of conviction is sufficiently low (p H [ 0 , g\ e eþc ). For a revenue-maximizing government, closing tax loopholes (g = 1) is always beneficial in a world without corruption.
TAX LOOPHOLES AND CORRUPTION
We now introduce corruption into the tax administration. Thus, the tax officials who are supposed to monitor firms are willing to support a firm in its potential tax evasion e in exchange for a bribe b.
11 To keep things simple, we assume that the tax official can reduce the probability of a trial to zero, such as by rubberstamping a tax file.
12 If a firm refuses to pay a bribe, it can nonetheless choose a positive amount of potential tax evasion e, but the official will report the case to his superiors and the firm will face a trial with certainty. We analyze a two-stage game in which the (representative) corrupt official sets the bribe rate before the firms submit their tax returns.
Firms have three options: (i) exploit the tax loopholes and pay a bribe, which yields e À b; (ii) exploit the loopholes without bribing the officials, which leads to the expected payoffs stated in (1) and (2); or (iii) engage in no disputable accounting transactions, which leads to a payoff normalized to zero. The L-type firms will either stay on the safe side, not risking any potential tax evasion, or pay the bribe to exploit the tax loopholes with the support of the corrupt official. The potential tax evasion will be profitable if b ≤ e. For H-type firms, the outside option depends on the risk g of being convicted as a tax evader. For high levels of g, the tradeoff is the same as that for the L-type firms. For g\ e eþc , however, the firms would risk evasion even without support from the corrupt official. The H-type firms will accept the corrupt official's offer only if b g Á e þ c ½ . The corrupt official knows the distribution of types but cannot identify the type of a single firm. This assumption does not imply that the corrupt official cannot discriminate at all. Clearly, bribes may be contingent on some observable firm characteristic, such as size, revenue or number of employees. However, firms with identical observable characteristics may still differ along many other, unobservable dimensions, such as their ability to and experience in handling complex accounting transactions. For simplicity, we do not model differences in 11. This is equivalent to a bargaining situation in which the corrupt tax official makes a take-it-orleave-it offer. We might also allow for a fraction of the tax officials to be honest, and honest tax officials report all suspected instances of tax evasion. We focus on the extreme case of comprehensive corruption to illustrate our point. For an extension of the model in this direction, see Section 4. For a bargaining approach, see for example Besley and Persson (2013) , who analyze the effect of punishment on bribery, when tax inspectors shield homogenous firms from legal prosecution. 12. In Section 5, we will analyze a variant of the model in which the probability of detection remains positive even when a bribe has been paid.
observable characteristics but rather focus on heterogeneity in unobservables.
13
This situation leaves the official with two alternatives: he or she can either charge a bribe that is acceptable to both types of firms (pooling) or target the Ltype firms only (separating). Targeting H-type firms only is not possible; any offer that H-type firms accept will always be accepted by L-type firms as well. With separating, the corrupt official charges b SEP = e, making the L-type firms indifferent. The total gain from corruption for the official amounts to B SEP = bÁe. With pooling, the bribe depends on the H-type firms' outside option:
for g [
The total bribe received by the corrupt official amounts to B POOL ¼ g Á e þ c ½ and B POOL = e. Figure 1 summarizes the profit-maximizing strategies for corrupt officials. The probability of defeat in court for H-type firms is denoted on the horizontal axis, where the vertical axis displays the share of L-type firms. For g e eþc , the official must engage in a tradeoff between the benefits from a larger 'customer base' in the case of pooling and the higher bribe from separating. For b [ g Á eþc e , i.e., for a high share of L-type firms or for a low probability g of punishment for the H-type firms, the corrupt official will find it optimal to only target L-type firms.
The exploitation of tax loopholes leads to revenue losses for the government. Let DT denote the expected revenue loss of the government, including back taxes 13. This imperfect observability of firm characteristics is quite standard in the theoretical literature (e.g., Choi and Thum, 2004; Seidel and Thum, 2016; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) . Furthermore, recent empirical studies show that the bribes demanded by officials often depend not only on characteristics that can easily be observed but also on expectations about non-observable characteristics (Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Olken and Barron, 2009; Svensson, 2003) . For example, the bribes demanded from truckers at military checkpoints in Indonesia depend on truck characteristics (Olken and Barron, 2009 ). However, soldiers at these checkpoints cannot directly observe the precise profitability of a single transport; hence, they also rely on expectations of profitability to determine their bribe demand. It is precisely this type of incomplete information about unobservable characteristics that interests us.
Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes that must be paid by firms convicted for tax evasion. The revenue loss can be written as follows:
In the case of pooling, all firms use tax loopholes with the assistance of corrupt officials. The government loses revenue e. With separating, all firms again attempt to use the tax loopholes, but only the L-type firms are assisted by the corrupt officials. The H-type firms, which have a share of 1 À b, are convicted for tax evasion with probability g and must pay e. The punishment probability g also reflects the ambiguity of the tax code. If g = 0, all transactions will be classified as legal tax avoidance by the court, and the government will lose revenues due to a smaller tax base. If g = 1, the tax code is so elaborate that all efforts to exploit tax loopholes will fail; these transactions are always classified as illegal tax evasion by the courts. In a world without corruption, the government would like to set g = 1. However, corrupt officials can hide disputable cases and turn potential tax revenues into bribe payments. Thus, if the government wants to maximize tax revenues, it should not eliminate all tax loopholes.
Proposition 1 A government that wants to minimize the expected revenue loss will not eliminate all tax loopholes. The expected revenue loss for the government is minimized when
Proof. The revenue loss DT SEP never exceeds DT POOL and decreases in g. Therefore,
minimizes the revenue loss.& Figure 2 shows the government's revenue loss as a function of the detection probability g. For very low levels of g, an increase in the detection probability is beneficial to the government because more of the H-type firms are punished as tax evaders. However, by increasing g above the critical threshold, the government induces the H-type firms to bribe corrupt officials. When g Ã ¼ b Á e eþc , the H-type firms are indifferent between evading on their own and bribing officials. A revenue-maximizing government will choose a more lenient policy (lower g) regarding attempts to exploit tax loopholes when the share of L-type firms decreases. Otherwise, a corrupt official would not find it optimal to target L-type firms only. A shrinking share of L-type firms would induce a corrupt official to make an offer that is attractive to both types of firms (pooling). To avoid this switch in strategy, the government must make it more attractive for H-type firms to exploit the tax loopholes without the support of corrupt officials, which can be achieved by increasing the probability of being acquitted (1 À g). The same mechanism is at work for the social cost c and the extent of disputable transactions e. Typically, the government cannot eliminate all disputable transactions (e = 0) because the tax code cannot take into account all contingencies. The second best strategy to maximize tax revenues is to implement some optimal leniency. Being too tough on potential tax evaders would boost bribes but would not reduce the exploitation of tax loopholes by H-type firms.
The government may be interested not only in maximizing tax revenues but also in the prevalence of corruption. Suppose for the moment that the government wants to minimize bribe payments and maximize revenues, then,
remains the best choice for the government. Increasing the probability for being punished as a tax evader beyond g* will induce H-type firms to choose the bribe option, and total bribes will rise. Figure 3 shows the total bribe as a function of the detection probability g. The government will not benefit in either dimension -tax revenues or fighting corruption -if it closes all tax loopholes.
Our admittedly simple model suffers from several shortcomings. First, we have focused only on two types of firms. Second, we have made the extreme assumption that all tax officials are corrupt. Third, we have provided the corrupt official Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes with a perfect concealing technique: the corrupt official has the power to avoid any further investigation into the tax matters of those who have paid a bribe. Fourth, we ignore the government's choice of other factors, such as the remuneration of officials and the punishment of tax evaders. In the following sections, we will discuss some of these extensions.
THE PREVALENCE OF CORRUPTION
So far, we have made the extreme assumption that all officials are corrupt and willing to assist the taxpayer in concealing illegal or at least disputable accounting transactions. In this section, we discuss the extent to which our finding that some tax loopholes are in the government's own interest still holds when only a fraction of tax officials are corrupt.
Suppose that only a fraction a of all tax officials are corrupt. All other tax officials report disputable accounting transactions to their superiors, and the cases are settled in court. Firms and tax officials are randomly matched, but firms know whether the official is willing to accept bribes before they submit their tax files.
14 This extension of our basic model is fairly straightforward. The outcome is simply a linear combination of the outcomes in Sections 2 and 3. Recall that matching between firms and officials occurs before tax returns are submitted; hence, firms condition their tax returns on the type of official. A share of 1 À a firms will meet with honest officials. Hence, all L-type firms in this group will avoid all disputable transactions. The H-type firms will avoid these transactions if g [ e eþc and accept the risk of being sentenced otherwise. A share a of firms will work with a corrupt official. Hence, the L-type firms will always pay the bribe, and the H-type firms will join them in the case of pooling, i.e., when g [ b Á e eþc . For lower g, there will be separating. The overall revenue loss can be written as follows:
where T SEP and T POOL denote the revenue losses as defined in (4). In contrast to the basic model, there is now a tradeoff for being lenient toward attempts to exploit tax loopholes ðg\1Þ. Leniency may yet be beneficial to curb the tax evasion of H-type firms that meet corrupt officials. Leniency, however, is also costly because it reduces the revenue from H-type firms that are assigned to honest officials.
Proposition 3 When faced with both honest and corrupt officials, a government that wants to minimize the expected revenue loss will not eliminate all tax 14. If the job rotation works well, such that firms do not know whether they face a corrupt official, L-type firms will never submit a tax statement with questionable accounting if the chances of meeting a corrupt official are sufficiently low. In this case, the information asymmetry between firms and official breaks down and the H-type firms collude with corrupt officials and evade taxes.
loopholes. The expected revenue loss for the government is minimized for 
If the share of corrupt officials a is sufficiently high, it will be expensive for the government to be tough on potential tax evaders because the firms will circumvent regulation by bribing tax officials. If most tax officials are honest, however, the government is better off accepting some corruption and closing the loopholes for the majority of taxpayers. The central mechanism from our basic model -tax loopholes may be beneficial for curbing corrupt officials -also holds in this extension of the model.
IMPERFECT CONCEALMENT
So far, we have assumed that collusion with a corrupt official perfectly protects a firm from further investigation of its tax files. This assumption was helpful for elaborating the role of tax loopholes in a corrupt environment, but it is clearly unrealistic. Tax officials may have the power to reduce the probability of detection and provide tips to better conceal disputable transactions, but the probability of detection can hardly be reduced to zero. In this section, we discuss the implications of an imperfect concealing technology. Bribing a tax official reduces the probability that a disputable accounting transaction will be detected below unity but does not completely eliminate the risk of being convicted as a tax evader.
As in our basic model, we assume that all tax officials are corrupt (a = 1). If a firm bribes a tax official, the probability of a detection will decrease to p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Hence, with probability p, the government distrusts the signal from the tax official and performs a detailed audit. We will refer to p as the probability that a detailed audit is carried out by the government (or honest superiors), despite a 'no evasion' signal from the tax official. If the firm is not willing to pay a bribe, the corrupt official will forward the tax files to his superiors; hence, the probability of a detailed audit is unity, and the tax authority will initiate a lawsuit if e > 0. As described above, the accounting transactions of the H-type firms will be judged as legal tax avoidance with a probability of 1 À g. The L-type firms will be sentenced for tax evasion with certainty. Hence, with corruption, the net benefit of tax evasion amounts to the following:
15. Note that DT is constant for g ≥ g**.
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for H-and L-type firms, respectively. To focus on the interesting cases, we assume p\ e eþc ; in other words, the detection probability is sufficiently low that there exists a non-negative bribe where even L-type firms find it attractive to exploit loopholes. As in the previous sections, we first calculate the profit-maximizing bribe for the corrupt official and then determine the government's revenue-maximizing choice of tax loopholes (1Àg).
The corrupt official's profit-maximizing bribe
A corrupt official's profit-maximizing bribe depends on the fallback strategy of the H-type firms as in Section 3. For g e eþc , the H-type firms will exploit tax loopholes even without the support of the corrupt officials. For g [ e eþc , the Htype firms require the support of the corrupt official to exploit tax loopholes. For notational convenience, we define g e eþc . Now, however, the participation constraint of the L-type firms matter. In Section 3, a pooling offer was always attractive for the L-type firms when it was attractive for the H-type firms. In other words, the L-type firms' willingness to pay for support from corrupt officials was always higher than that of the H-type firms. This is no longer the case in our extended model. Because there is now a positive probability of detection p, the L-type firms may constrain the corrupt official when setting the bribe. Those firms that, for a given bribe, receive lower benefits from colluding with the corrupt official determine the pooling offer. Comparing profits (1') and (2') shows that the pooling offer will be determined by the H-type firms
and by the L-type firms for g [ g. Because g\ g, we must distinguish three cases when analyzing the corrupt official's bribe setting. For g g (case 1), the corrupt official can either make a pooling offer that is sufficiently attractive to the H-type firms or target only the L-type firms with a separating offer. For g\g g (case 2), the pooling offer must be sufficiently attractive to the L-type firms. Alternatively, the corrupt official can make a separating offer to H-type firms. In cases 1 and 2, the outside option of the H-type firms is to exploit the tax loopholes without the support of the official. For g [ g (case 3), the alternatives are the same for the corrupt official as in case 2. However, the outside option of the H-type firms has changed; without the support of the corrupt official, they will not try to exploit tax loopholes.
16. H-type firms compare the profits from bribing the official with their outside option, which is avoiding taxes on their own (left-hand side). L-type firms gain p L from bribing the official (right-hand side).
Proposition 4 Depending on the extent of existing loopholes (g) and the share of L-type firms (b), a corrupt official will maximize his bribe income by adopting the following strategies: (a) For low detection probabilities (g g), the corrupt official will target L-type firms if the share of these firms is sufficiently high
). (b) For high detection probabilities, the corrupt official will target H-type firms if b is sufficiently low (b\1
for g\g g and
In all other cases, the corrupt official offers pooling contracts, which attract both types of firms.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.& Figure 4 illustrates the official's optimal strategies. For very low detection probabilities (g g), the corrupt official will target L-type firms if the share of these firms is sufficiently high (b). Here, it does not pay to make an attractive offer to H-type firms because their outside option -exploiting tax loopholes without the support of the official -is fairly attractive. The dividing line between separating and pooling is illustrated by the upward sloping line OD in Figure 4 (see condition (A.1)). The corrupt official may also employ a separating strategy, if the detection probabilities are higher (g\g 1). Here, however, the corrupt official targets H-type firms. This strategy only pays off for sufficiently high shares of H-type firms (low b; see conditions (A.2) and (A.3) in the Appendix for details). In all other cases, the corrupt official chooses pooling. In Figure 4 , the border between pooling and separating is illustrated by the curve HEF. As in our basic model, the corrupt official will find it profitable to target the L-type firms when the outside option of H-type firms is attractive. In contrast to the basic model, however, pooling does not prevail in all other cases. A new type of separating contract emerges as the positive detection probability p depresses the willingness to pay of the L-type firms.
The government's design of tax loopholes
We now turn to the question of whether the government should close all tax loopholes. The government chooses the level g for which the total revenue loss is minimized. We calculate this revenue loss for each case depicted in Figure 4 . 3) ). By collecting the terms for tax evasion, we obtain the expected revenue loss for the government:
Note that for sufficiently high levels of b, the corrupt official will never find it optimal to target H-type firms via separating contracts (see Figure 4) .
Proposition 5 With imperfect concealment of tax evasion by corrupt tax officials, a government that wants to minimize the expected revenue loss will (a) not eliminate all tax loopholes for b pÁc 1Àp ½ Áe . The expected revenue loss for the government is minimized when g = g 3 , which leads to the separating of H-type firms. It will (b) eliminate all tax loopholes (g = 1) for
; this induces the corrupt official to offer pooling contracts. It will (c) not eliminate all loopholes for b ! pÁ 1Àp ½ Áeþc ½ eÀpÁ eþc ½ ; the expected revenue loss for the government is minimized when g = g 1 , which leads to the separating of L-type firms.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.& The optimal solutions for the government are illustrated by the bold lines in Figure 4 . As in the basic model, it is optimal for a revenue-maximizing government to accept large tax loopholes (cf. DJ in Figure 4 ) when there are many L-type firms. Closing tax loopholes would induce the corrupt officials to reduce their bribe so that both types of firms are willing to collude with him or her. Hence, eliminating tax loopholes in this case will only reduce the expected tax collection from H-type firms and will not affect the expected tax collection from L-type firms. The opposite is the case if there are many H-type firms (low b). Here, it may be optimal to maintain small tax loopholes (cf. EF in Figure 4 ). The corrupt official targets H-type firms, and the government can fully tax L-type firms. Again, closing loopholes would induce the corrupt official to switch to pooling, and the government would suffer revenue losses. In intermediate cases, it is optimal to close all tax loopholes (cf. KL in Figure 4) . Here, the gains from higher tax collection from H-type firms (in the case of detection) compensate for the revenue losses resulting from the collusion of H-and L-type firms with corrupt officials.
Overall, our extension, which allows for positive audit probabilities, yields qualitatively the same results as the basic model. It remains the case that the government may have no incentive to punish all the firms that attempt to exploit tax loopholes. Although this situation is always optimal in the basic model, it remains optimal in the extended model only when the share of L-type firms is sufficiently high or low.
AN ALTERNATIVE AUDITING STRATEGY
So far, we have assumed that the government only has to determine the size of tax loopholes to maximize tax revenues, and the audit probabilities were exogenously given. At the cost of some additional complexity, one could easily endogenize the audit probability p. The audit probability captures the degree to which the government mistrusts the signal from a tax official. Suspicious tax files are audited with probability one; all tax files that are not reported as suspicious are inspected in detail with probability p by honest superiors. Clearly, an increase in the audit probability uncovers more wrongdoings and thus leads to additional tax revenues. However, this comes at a cost, as each audit consumes resources, especially because honest auditors usually have to have substantially higher wages (Besley and McLaren, 1993) . Hence, the audit probability p, which we have used as a parameter in our model, can be seen as the result of the government's net revenue maximization. Let C(p) with C 0 ; C 00 [ 0 denote the cost of tax audits performed by honest superiors as a function of the audit probability. When a government wants to maximize net revenues, it will optimally mistrust signals from tax officials with probability p* so that
17 Trusting tax officials' reports has the benefit that honest tax officials report only suspicious cases and all clean tax files do not have to be inspected a second time. However, it has the disadvantage that some corrupt officials use rubberstamping of tax files to help tax evaders. The optimal auditing probability p* will depend not only on factors such as the share of corrupt officials and the distribution of firm types but also on the cost of additional auditing.
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Could the government be better off by neglecting the bureaucrats' signals and employing pure randomization of its tax audits? Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom regularly perform such random audits to improve their auditing selection algorithms. Truly random, large-scale audits are, however, admittedly rare as standard procedures (Slemrod, 2007) . We will briefly sketch the government's tradeoff between purely random tax audits and the previous scenario of tax loopholes and small audit probabilities.
In the alternative scenario, the government closes all tax loopholes and randomly inspects firms using a few expensive but honest tax officials. Let p 0 denote this audit probability. To deter firms from evading taxes, the government must choose an audit probability that fulfills e À p 0 Á e þ c ½ !0. As audits are costly, the government will choose p 0 ¼ e eþc . This audit strategy will eliminate all attempts of tax evasion but it comes at the cost of more intensive tax auditing. Instead of inspecting a share p* of firms, now the government has to inspect a share of p 0 [ p Ã firms. 19 The comparison between the two strategies boils down to 17. When all officials are corrupt, the revenue losses can be calculated by inserting the optimal tax loopholes into equation (7). 18. We do not display the full model here, as no fundamental new insights can be gained from this extension. 19. Note that we have assumed that the marginal audit costs are sufficiently large. Then, it is optimal for the government to choose a relatively low audit probability
Þ . This is not the case when honest officials can be employed very cheaply.
Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes
This simple extension of our model shows that the availability of purely random tax audits does not make tax loopholes obsolete as a strategic tool. Depending on the costs of tax audits, the government may be better off accepting the exploitation of tax loopholes by some taxpayers rather than randomly auditing a larger number of firms.
CONCLUSION
We introduce a simple model of tax loopholes that generate borderline cases between tax evasion and tax avoidance. Tax officials may be able to identify whether a firm has tried to exploit such tax loopholes but be unable to assess tax-planning capabilities. More able firms can successfully contest accusations of tax evasion in a lawsuit. A government that maximizes total tax revenues may face incentives to not close all tax loopholes when there are corrupt officials in the administration. Closing tax loopholes may induce some firms to collaborate with corrupt tax officials rather than exploiting tax loopholes on their own. This increases bribe payments and may furthermore decrease tax revenue as the resulting tax losses may be larger than the gains from less tax avoidance. The approach of this paper can answer some questions surrounding the use of tax loopholes by firms in the presence of corrupt tax officials, but it leaves many other questions open for future research. For instance, this paper completely ignores important aspects of efficiency. Neither entry nor exit decisions of firms are considered. However, when firms are heterogeneous, corruption in the tax administration may force some firms to exit the market. Furthermore, firms may be forced to distort their input choices to exploit tax loopholes, thus generating efficiency costs for the economy. We also neglect dynamic aspects. A corrupt official may learn about the tax-planning abilities of a firm over time if there is repeated interaction in audits. 20 Finally, we also ignore the cost of implementing a particular policy, for example, closing tax loopholes.
½ with the separating and pooling strategy, respectively. The profit-maximizing strategy is found by comparing the revenues:
We turn now to case 2 (g \g g). Here, the corrupt official may either address all firms (pooling) by making a sufficiently attractive offer to the L-type firms or focus on the H-type firms only (separating). With pooling, the highest bribe that is accepted by the L-type firms amounts to b 2 POOL ¼ e À p Á e þ c ½ , yielding a bribe revenue of the corrupt official of B 2 POOL ¼ e À p Á e þ c ½ . A higher bribe than b 2 POOL would be accepted only by the H-type firms. The outside option of the H-type firms is to exploit the tax loopholes without the support of the official. To maximize his earnings from separating, the corrupt official must make the H-type firms indifferent to accepting the offer (e À p Á g Á e þ c ½ Àb) or evading on their own without the official's support (e À g Á e þ c ½ ). Therefore, the corrupt official charges b 
Comparing the official's revenues leads to the following:
Note that the right-hand side of (A.2) is concave in g, becomes zero for g ¼ g, and reaches pÁc 1Àp ½ Áe for g ¼ g.
Because the willingness to pay of the L-type firms is the constraining factor when setting the pooling bribe, pooling pays off only when the share of L-type firms is sufficiently high.
Finally, for g [ e eþc (case 3), none of the firms would carry out disputable accounting transactions without the support of corrupt officials. Again, the corrupt official can target both types of firms or only one type when making an offer. The more attractive partners for the separating strategy are again the H-type firms because their net benefit from tax evasion is higher and the corrupt official can appropriate these net benefits by setting the bribe accordingly. With separating, the bribe amounts to b 3 SEP ¼ e À p Á g Á e þ c ½ making the H-type indifferent to accepting or rejecting the offer (p H = 0). The total revenue for the corrupt official is B
. With pooling, the corrupt official charges the highest bribe that is accepted by both types of firms. Hence, the official must make the L-type firms indifferent to accepting or rejecting the offer: b 3 POOL ¼ e À p Á e þ c ½ . The revenue from bribes becomes B
3
POOL ¼ e À p Á e þ c ½ . To find the profit-maximizing strategy for the tax official, we compare the bribe revenues:
Condition (A.3) describes the borderline cases between pooling and separating. The right-hand side of (A.3) decreases and is concave in g; it begins at pÁc 1Àp ½ Áe for g ¼ g and becomes zero for g = 1.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 5
It is easy to establish that g 1 , g 3 and g = 1 are the only candidates to minimize revenue losses. In each range, the revenue losses decline in g. Hence, only the upper limits of each range in (7) are candidates for revenue minimization. Because the condition for the revenue loss is the same in both pooling cases, only g = 1 can be optimal with pooling. (a) This leaves us with g 1 (line 0I in Figure 4 ), g 3 (line EF in Figure 4 ) and g = 1 if both types of separating are feasible. Inserting g 3 in the third line of (7) The first inequality holds because we have assumed that the detection probability is sufficiently low that the L-type firms are willing to exploit the tax loopholes with the support of a corrupt official (p\ 
